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BINDING STATUTORY EARLY OFFERS BY
DEFENDANTS, NOT PLAINTIFFS, IN PERSONAL
INJURY SUITS
Jeffrey O'Connell* & Evan Stephenson**
INTRODUCTION
For some time now, the senior author has advanced an alternative
to the current tort system in personal injury cases, including claims of
medical malpractice.1 The alternative is defined in the following way:
A defendant would have statutory power to make a binding statuto-
rily defined "Early Offer" to pay the plaintiff's net economic losses as
they accrue. 2 If a defendant makes such an offer, the plaintiff can
only proceed to trial by rejecting the offer, but to recover full common
law damages the plaintiff must then prove the defendant's grossly neg-
ligent misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt.
3
When promoting this early offers alternative, the senior author has
been met with misgivings about the defendant's ability to bind the
plaintiff-victim in this manner. Why, one might ask, should the al-
leged wrongdoer be given so much unilateral power over the plain-
tiff's claim? A fair question. We seek here to resolve this concern by
* Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A., Dartmouth College,
1951; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1954.
** B.A., George Mason University, 2002; J.D. expected, University of Virginia Law School.,
2005.
1. See generally Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373 (2002); Jeffrey
O'Connell & Geoffrey Paul Eaton, Binding Early Offers as a Simple, If Second Best, Alternative
to Tort Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 858 (1999); Jeffrey O'Connell, Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault &
Quasi-Criminal Liability, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (1992); Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That
Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claim-
ants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589 (1982) [hereinafter O'Connell, Offers That
Can't Be Refused].
2. See O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, supra note 1, at 601-04.
3. Early Offers for Medical Injury Act § 3 [hereinafter Early Offers Act] (unenacted model
act, on file with the DePaul Law Review) (providing that a claimant may pursue a cause of
action subsequent to a valid early offer "against the health provider for injury but only if it can
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt" that the provider "was guilty of wanton or intentional
misconduct in causing the injury"). For the terms of other bills incorporating the early offers
idea, see S. 1861, 104th Cong. (1996) (introduced by Senator Mitch McConnell (R.-Ky.); Mass.
House Bill no. 5700 (May 1986) (introduced by then-Governor Michael Dukakis (D.-Mass.);
H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. (1985) (introduced by then-Congressman Richard Gephardt (D.-Mo.)).
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explaining how an early offers statute is like judo: it turns the plain-
tiffs' strengths to the advantage of defendants and to the advantage of
plaintiffs when there are arguably meritorious claims.4 An early of-
fers law greatly reduces the wide range of possible negative bargaining
outcomes for such plaintiffs, along with some favorable possibilities,
and replaces them with a desirable and sensible insurance result: an
immediate and binding guarantee of payment for net economic losses
as they accrue. The corporate defendant's risk aversion and its capac-
ity for self-interested calculation encourage it to remove the dispute
from the risky, costly, dilatory, and wasteful world of tort claims and
to earn that exit by promptly compensating plaintiffs with arguably
meritorious claims for their actual economic losses.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the early offers alternative.
Part III explains why the current system has not led to the desirable
results that an early offers law would encourage. Part IV demon-
strates that under a "reverse" early offers system-in which plaintiffs
have the power to bind defendants with early offers to pay the plain-
tiffs' net economic losses-the plaintiff has little or no incentive to
differentiate between arguably meritorious and clearly non-meritori-
ous claims. Part V advances evidence put forth elsewhere that sup-
ports the admittedly controversial proposition that, even if a system
existed in which binding early offers by plaintiffs entailed their incen-
tive to distinguish between meritorious and non-meritorious claims,
individual plaintiffs (even with the assistance of sophisticated counsel)
cannot be expected to make this distinction as well as corporate deci-
sionmakers. In particular, the theory goes, because corporate deci-
sionmakers face the discipline of accountability to markets within and
without their companies, and because corporations diversify their
decisionmaking processes, their choices are less likely to suffer as
greatly from the cognitive biases which afflict individuals, especially
injured ones. Part VI iterates that when defendants make early offers,
they do so to the advantage of plaintiffs over the uncertain, costly, and
protracted process of demanding compensation through litigation. An
early offers statute seeks to enlist the strengths of defendant-corpora-
tions in the service of legitimate plaintiff-victims.
II. EARLY OFFERS: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
Under an early offers statute, all disputes remain at the outset in the
current tort system. The plaintiff files a claim (very often with the
4. Broadly viewed, early offers are not as zero-sum as martial arts. But for purposes of ad-
dressing the charge of prodefendant one-sidedness, the analogy fits.
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help of a lawyer), presumably for economic and non-economic dam-
ages, with the lawyer exacting a contingent fee. The early offers plan
thereupon gives the defendant a fixed time period (e.g., 180 days) dur-
ing which it may remove the claim from the current tort system by
making an early offer. The early offer amount is statutorily defined
and calculated. The defendant simply offers to pay what the statute
determines-namely, the plaintiff's net economic loss as it accrues,
plus reasonable plaintiff's attorney's fees (e.g., a pre-defined presump-
tion by statute of ten percent of the current value of the payment
due). Nothing is payable for non-economic damages such as pain and
suffering.
Net economic loss generally includes medical and rehabilitation ex-
penses necessitated by the disputed injury (not already compensated
by the plaintiff's own insurance), 5 and, for example, eighty percent of
lost wages that cannot be avoided through mitigation. 6 If the defen-
dant makes such an early offer to pay uncompensated economic loss,
the claim exits the current tort system in one of two ways: the plaintiff
either (1) accepts the offer, receives the statutorily defined compensa-
tion as losses accrue, 7 and the tort claim is settled; or (2) the plaintiff
rejects the offer, thereby retaining the right to seek both economic
and non-economic damages, but in order to recover must prove the
defendant's wanton or intentional misconduct beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 If the defendant makes no early offer, the current system re-
mains in place in its entirety, including the possibility of seeking all
non-economic damages such as pain and suffering as well as punitive
damages. In the case of seriously injured claimants with minimal net
economic losses, an early offer from a defendant must be a minimum
of $250,000.
An early offers law might seem at first blush to empower defend-
ants disproportionately over the claims of plaintiffs. To some, this will
smack of injustice. The defendant can unilaterally eliminate the plain-
tiff's ability to obtain pain and suffering damages, except in extraordi-
narily egregious cases; such as, in clear cases of gross negligence.
5. See Early Offers Act, supra note 3, §§ 2(h), 2(i)(1)-(2) (including medical expenses, and
placing limitations on the definition of medical expenses); (j) (including rehabilitation); (n) (ex-
cluding from early offers the plaintiff's own medical insurance coverage). Payment for more
than net economic loss frequently amounts to a violation of the principle of indemnity, on which
the proper functioning of insurance rests. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defend-
ants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981
U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 344-48, 366-67.
6. Early Offers Act, supra note 3, §§ 2(h)(i)-(ii).
7. Id. § 4(a).
8. Id. § 3.
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Since defendants would only make such offers if they lessened the
expected payout, plaintiffs with arguably valid claims would seem to
be made worse off from the point of view of expected payoff, whereas
if the plaintiff's claim is weak, the defendant need not make an offer.
That looks like a win-win for the defense. Thus, an early offers law
might seem to provide defendants with a one-sided option at the
plaintiff's expense.
But this zero-sum view, we contend, is inaccurate. Early offers will
indeed improve the position of defendants, but by no means necessa-
rily to the detriment of plaintiffs. The early offers plan seeks to refute
the preconception that anything good for defendants is bad for plain-
tiffs and vice versa. True, defendants' early offers can lower plaintiffs'
probability of receiving greater awards so drastically that litigation is
practically pointless. But plaintiffs gain too: plaintiffs' risks are cut
short along with defendants'. True, plaintiffs lose their chance at com-
pensation for pain and suffering, but they gain by the elimination of
uncertainty, delay in payment, high transaction costs, and the inevita-
ble frustration associated with litigation. One cannot overstate the
value to injured victims of the peace of mind that accompanies a guar-
antee of essential payment, with no significant delay, and with no
costly process of prolonged and often bitter lawsuits. As an extra ad-
vantage, in an early offers world plaintiffs receive all the compensa-
tion determined by the statute, since plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are paid
by the defendant in addition to net economic loss. Nor would it be
only cases with a high probability of plaintiff success where the early
offer would be made. Given the high costs when an offer is not
made-duplicating collateral sources, high transaction costs on both
sides, and payment for pain and suffering-the incentives to make
early offers will extend to many more than just the worst cases. One
leading malpractice lawyer has opined that if an early offers bill were
passed, he would advise making an early offer in 200 of the 250 cases
that his large multi-city office was then defending.9
III. THE INCAPACITY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM TO REPLICATE
THE EARLY OFFERS RESULT
If early offers can provide so many benefits to both plaintiffs and
defendants, one might ask: Why don't adverse parties now reach the
early offers result on their own? After all, under present law, either
party can make an offer to settle for the claimant's net economic
9. Interview with William Ginsburg, Esq., in Durham, North Carolina (Apr. 15, 1986).
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loss.10 A pertinent question, then, is why a statute is needed to en-
courage such settlements.
Even though, as we contend, the optimal resolution of many per-
sonal injury claims is prompt payment of a claimant's net economic
loss, today neither defendants nor plaintiffs are at all inclined to make
such offers. In the first place, without a statute, neither plaintiffs nor
defendants can negate the right of any collateral source to
subrogation.
Much more importantly, the defendant may be confident of defeat-
ing or at least wearing down claimants, given the difficulties and de-
lays in proving a tort claim. The long delay before trial often enables
defendants to bargain down even claimants clearly entitled to tort
damages because they need immediate money for medical bills and
wage loss.11 Delaying procedural tactics also are used to lessen the
value of the contingent fee of plaintiffs' counsel.'
2 Furthermore, de-
fendants will fear that an early offer to settle for claimants' net eco-
nomic loss will be seen as a signal of weakness and simply encourage
claimants and their lawyers to seek an even larger settlement than
originally sought. This mirrors the position of plaintiffs and their
counsel who similarly fear that an early offer to settle only for eco-
nomic loss would be deemed an admission of weakness resulting in
either no payment or less than that otherwise sought.
13 Thus, even if
defendants were to make such an offer, claimants could be expected
to reject it. Defendants also must normally sweeten any settlement
offer for actual losses by at least one-third to cover claimants' legal
fees, lest they come out of claimants' own pockets.
14 In addition, de-
fense attorneys, paid by the hour with additional payment for days in
court, often seek to settle cases only after a jury is sworn in so they
can collect an additional fee. 15 As a result, defendants may fail to
offer a prompt settlement for a claimant's net economic loss even
when it is seemingly advantageous to do so.
10. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 155 (discussing the twin
concepts of the claimant's "minimum ask" and the defendant's "maximum offer").
11. See id. at 156 (stating that defense attorneys can take advantage of "plaintiffs with low
income and the uninsured . . . by using various tactics to delay the date at which the case is
resolved").
12. See id. at 78 (indicating that "the best return on the lawyer's investment occurs if the claim
settles quickly").
13. See generally Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198
(1987).
14. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSUR-
ANCE 14, 45 (1971).
15. Id.
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Workers' compensation and auto no-fault laws have avoided these
troublesome dilemmas by forcing both parties to accept the disposi-
tion of claims for only claimants' economic losses regardless of either
party's fault. However, a sweeping no-fault solution seems infeasible
for medical malpractice (as well as products liability) claims in light of
the difficulty of defining the insured events. 16 Thus, the only way to
prevent a rejection of settlements for net economic loss is to allow one
party the capacity to require the other party to accept such a
settlement.
IV. PLAINTIFFS (AND THEIR COUNSEL) LACK INCENTIVES TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MERITORIOUS AND
NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIMS
Even granting that plaintiffs and defendants both gain from an early
offers system, why should the defendant be the one with power to
bind the plaintiff? If the plaintiff and defendant gain so much, per-
haps the plaintiff should have the power to make a binding early offer
for payment of net economic loss by the defendant. In that connec-
tion, let us assume something like the mirror image of the proposed
early offers law: A plaintiff may offer to accept net economic loss as it
accrues; if the defendant rejects the offer, the defendant must prove
that it was non-negligent beyond a reasonable doubt. One could label
this a "reverse" early offers plan.
If claimants could force defendants to settle, many claimants could
be expected to make almost random claims and realistically expect to
extract at least some payment from a defendant (more on this in a
moment). Furthermore, any screening device to separate arguably
meritorious from non-meritorious tort claims would undoubtedly be
almost as cumbersome as the present system. In fact, such screenings
are already a large part of the present system, with motions to dismiss
supposedly unmeritorious claims commonplace; nevertheless, the tide
of tort litigation rolls along. 17
To pursue why a "reverse" early offers plan would not work, note
that plaintiffs and their counsel would simply lack sufficient incentives
to weed out frivolous or non-meritorious claims under such a plan. Of
course, potential plaintiffs and counsel want to maximize compensa-
tion (just as defendants want to minimize it). As the recipient of com-
pensation, a plaintiff cannot be expected to act against self-interest by
16. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, supra note 1, at 597 n.42.
17. For an example of a statutory screening device in medical malpractice cases, see IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-18-1 et seq. (Michie 1973).
238 [Vol. 54:233
2005] BINDING EARLY OFFERS BY DEFENDANTS 239
declaring the claim to be non-meritorious. In a system in which plain-
tiffs may unilaterally bind defendants, the predominant safeguard
against frivolous claims would only be claimants' honor.'
8 Defend-
ants' treasuries would be largely left ajar.
Imagine a patient with an ear infection that has grown steadily
worse. The patient has incurred considerable costs in treatment and
has run short of funds. The patient knows that by making an early
offer to the treating physician, a distinct likelihood of payment for net
economic loss arises. What incentive do such patients have to ask
themselves hard questions about such a claim? Did the treatment
cause the condition to worsen? Was the treatment negligent? In
other words, how much merit under substantive tort law does this
claim have? The patient with the ear infection has little or no reason
to probe any of these questions. Unlike defendants, individual plain-
tiffs have an incentive to be thoroughly satisfied when their own frivo-
lous or meritless claims are paid. The power to bind a defendant
unilaterally would create a perverse incentive to exploit the system
with marginal claims or worse.
Even if defendants as the entity making payment normally want to
pay the smallest amount feasible, the early offers law constrains de-
fendants' ability to make unfair "low-ball" offers.
19 The defendant
must make the minimum payment required (net economic loss) in or-
der to forestall the plaintiff's further pursuit of a claim. When con-
fronted with particularly meritless claims, defendants will desire to
pay nothing and will make no offer-as they should. But when faced
with arguably meritorious claims, they will minimize their risk by test-
ing whether making the statutorily defined early offer involves less
exposure than a full scale tort suit with all its uncertainty and transac-
tion costs. The defendant alone must distinguish carefully between
arguably meritorious and clearly non-meritorious claims as a way of
reducing costs by prompt payment of the specified benefits.
As another rationale for placing the responsibility for the early of-
fer in the hands of the defendant, note that the defendant has greater
access to information regarding liability. Plaintiffs (and their attor-
neys) have an adverse outcome they can cite but they are often fishing
for whatever fault existed, perhaps especially in medical malpractice
cases. Defendants, however, have full and ready access to the records
and to the individuals that allegedly engaged in the substandard prac-
18. In my opinion, screening devices are limited in their effectiveness and largely preserve the
current fault-based system.
19. See Early Offers Act, supra note 3, § 3.
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tice. They are better positioned to make a relatively quick assessment
of the value of the claim.
From another perspective, placing the early offer in defendants'
hands also makes sense because the ball is after all in the defendants'
"court." They are expected to "return serve" anyway, so an early of-
fer by defendants seems a natural progression in the adjudication
process. 20
V. ARE CORPORATE DEFENDANTS LESS AFFECTED BY COGNITIVE
BIASES THAN INDIVIDUAL CLAIMANTS AND
THEIR COUNSEL?
Under an admittedly more controversial theory, consider the fol-
lowing: Arguably plaintiffs should not be granted unilateral power to
bind because, even if they did have an incentive to ferret out non-
meritorious claims, they cannot be expected to calculate the costs ver-
sus the benefits of paying claims nearly as well as defendant insurance
companies. Claimants' capacity to calculate the costs and benefits of
paying early offer claims is not anywhere equal to that of defendants.
Psychologists and behavioral economists claim that individuals fall
prey to certain cognitive biases in their judgment.21 These biases af-
fect people non-uniformly.2 2 They vary across cultures, educational
groups, and gender, and from person to person.23 But even so, a cor-
porate entity probably suffers less from emotional cognitive biases
than individual plaintiffs (and even their lawyers). Insurance compa-
nies as a group tend to be less quixotic in their reasoning than idiosyn-
cratic tort victims. Their decisionmaking is diversified among many
experienced hands. Overlapping decisionmaking in business tends to
discipline every link in the chain of command for mistakes that dimin-
ish company value.2 4 Companies are thereby institutionally better
suited to overcoming biases in judgment than already anguished tort
victims, with no recourse to others besides their own lawyers (more on
the role of plaintiffs' lawyers in a moment).
20. For these last two points in the text concerned with the appropriateness of putting the
initiative on defendants, I am grateful to Tom Hafemesiter of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry
and Public Policy at the University of Virginia (although he is not responsible for the thrust of
this whole Article).
21. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Tradedfor Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 82 (2002).
22. See id. at 86-87.
23. Id. at 87.
24. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288,
289, 292-96 (1980).
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Gregory Mitchell, Assistant Professor of Law and Psychology at
Florida State University, observes that "[r]esearch from psychology
and behavioral economics studies reveals that human judgment and
decisionmaking necessarily rely on imperfect psychological mecha-
nisms that cause systematic departures from rationality.
'25 Professor
Mitchell concludes that "individuals differ greatly in their propensities
to act rationally and that situations differ greatly in their propensities
to elicit rational behavior from individuals.
' 26 From individuals, he
argues, one can by no means expect stable and predictable rational-
ity.27 Variations in rationality are individual and situational: People
differ from each other, and the same person reasons differently in al-
ternative situations.28 Mitchell focuses on the importance of both
emotions and accountability.
Perhaps the most important individual variations for tort settle-
ments are differences in emotions. Any given person's judgment di-
verges depending on one's emotional (read "affective") state:29 "As
one's affective state changes, so may the nature of one's cognitive
processing and goals; conversely, the decisions one makes may have
profound effects on one's own affective state."
' 30 Psychologists associ-
ate "negative mood states" with inducement of systematic and data-
driven thinking. 31 Positive moods, on the other hand, induce heuris-
tic 32 or theory-driven reasoning. 33 One would expect the bargaining
posture of both positive and negative feelings on the part of plaintiffs
in, say, medical malpractice situations to vary. An overly optimistic
plaintiff34 might rely on a heuristic in which injured people are more
likely to win than they really are, and insist on proceeding to the jury
rather than settling.35 Others with claims of similar merit will not so
decide, and the disparity will contribute to divergent results.
25. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 70-71 (2002).
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 75-76.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 73, 98-101.
30. Id. at 99.
31. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 100.
32. "Heuristic" refers to a problem-solving technique ingrained by early experience that 
does
not give rigorously accurate results. It entails matters resistant to proof, needing further 
empiri-
cal research. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Joseph R. Baldwin, (In)Juries, (In)Justice, and (II)Legal
Blame: Tort Law as Melodrama-or Is It Farce?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 425, 433 n.42 (2002) (citing
NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK 
ABOUT ACCIDENTS 45-49
(2000)).
33. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 100.
34. Id. at 101 (noting that positive moods tend to increase an individual's optimism).
35. However, if tort claims can be likened to betting, they may make plaintiffs more risk
averse. Id. at 101. Professor Mitchell states that "[tihe general effect of positive mood on peo-
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Negative-feeling people naturally tend to be pessimistic. 36 A nega-
tively disposed person might well settle early for less than is deserved.
Particularly strong emotions-which could be expected in the highly
charged atmosphere of malpractice claims-can overwhelm people
and make them feel that they are prone to act against their interests. 37
It is not difficult to imagine an upset malpractice claimant "damning
the torpedoes." Emotions play so prominent a role in settlement ne-
gotiations that Vanderbilt University Law School Professor Chris
Guthrie argues that many plaintiffs negotiate partially to avoid feel-
ings of regret, rather than solely to maximize expected value. 38 Im-
portant also is that the plaintiff will normally have only one serious
tort claim in a lifetime, whereas defense personnel will deal with
many.39 Although insurance company decisionmakers are human too,
their "skin is not in the game" the way a plaintiff's is, and they are
highly likely to be less emotional about paying than victims are about
being paid. Although Professor Mitchell limits the scope of his article
to individuals, it stands to reason that aggregates of persons with dif-
ferent temperaments-as one would expect in the corporate decision-
making context-would dilute the influence of any single person's
idiosyncratic emotions. All in all, it seems reasonable to propose that
a team of insurance company decisionmakers suffer less from emo-
tional distortions in judgment than an individual injured tort victim.
Keep in mind in this connection that personal injury lawyers often
practice without partners or with comparatively few of them. 40 Thus,
pie's betting is to decrease their willingness to bet in situations where potential losses are great."
Id. (citing Thomas E. Nygren et al., The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision Rule in Risk
Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather than Probability, 66
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 59, 69 (1996)).
36. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 101 ("[Overall,] a person in a negative mood is more likely to
evaluate ambiguous evidence negatively and draw more negative inferences than a person in a
positive mood.").
37. Id. at 102 ("Intense emotions may even substantially disrupt ordinary cognitive processes
to the point at which people feel as if they have lost control of themselves and are simply being
driven by prevailing emotional states even against their own self-interest.").
38. Id. at 103-04 (citing Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory
of Litigation, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 44-45).
39. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 215 (analyzing the problems in "a market dominated by
one-time claimants").
40. See Ted Schneyer, Empirical Research with a Policy Payoff- Market Dynamics for Lawyers
Who Represent Plaintiffs for a Contingent Fee, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1833 (2002). Schneyer
notes:
For lawyers specializing in plaintiff's work, the financial risk is especially acute. As
Daniels and Martin point out, plaintiff's lawyers represent clients who are unlikely to
bring them other kinds of business in the event of a downturn in contingent-fee work.
Moreover, most specialists in the field-eighty-one percent of the lawyers Daniels and
Martin surveyed-are sole practitioners or practice in very small firms.
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even if a lawyer representing a tort victim client was less emotionally
involved than the client, the lawyer and the client are still only usually
two people (or at least very few), far less than one would expect to
work on significant claims in an insurance company claims depart-
ment. The lawyer and client together, while better than just the client
alone, are probably less emotionally diversified than corporate
decisionmakers.
Further, it would be unwise to be sanguine about the plaintiff's law-
yer's dispassion or to overestimate counsel's ability to influence an
upset plaintiff. In his book recounting his career as a personal injury
lawyer, for example, then-Senator from North Carolina, John Ed-
wards went to great length to explain how he became highly emotion-
ally invested in his clients' cases.
41
It is hard to imagine the claims departments of Aetna, Allstate, or
St. Paul's allowing themselves to become so personally involved with
any particular claim. On balance, then, plaintiffs' lawyers are likely to
be more emotional about medical malpractice and other personal in-
jury cases they work on than insurance company personnel working
on the same claims. This is not to deny that lawyers are often crucial
Id. See also id. at 1833 n.29 ("Similarly, a 1995 survey of a random sample of the members of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) revealed that two-thirds of plaintiffs' lawyers
practiced in firms comprised of five or fewer lawyers." (citing Mark Galanter, Anyone Can Fall
Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470-71
(1998))).
41. Throughout his book, John Edwards writes about his emotional involvement in his trials.
For example, he describes how terrified and scared he felt when one client completely entrusted
his case to Edwards's judgment. JOHN EDWARDS & JOHN AUCHARD, FOUR TRIALS 6-7, 21
(2004). Edwards describes one lawsuit as his "calling." Id. at 16. He notes that, at least for him.,
"these [personal injury legal] battles are never really abstract." Id. at 27. When defense lawyers
attacked one of his clients in closing arguments, it was personally "infuriating to" Edwards. Id.
at 47. A lawsuit between Edwards's client and a hospital is characterized as a struggle between
David and Goliath. Id. at 83, 85. When a judge reduced a multi-million dollar medical malprac-
tice verdict, Edwards was as angry as he had ever been "in [his] entire life." Id. at 112. Many
other plaintiffs' lawyers exhibit similar passionate emotionalism. For example, Jacob Fuchsberg,
a renowned plaintiffs' lawyer before becoming a judge, once said:
When you say a [person] is objective, you are not describing a good lawyer. When a
case is about to come to trial, I'm hard to settle with, because I've come to know the
people, not just the file. There may have been an estimate of what the case was
worth-which I concurred in superficially-but now I know the people.
JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT Lo'rERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 
147 (1979). Another
one-time leading plaintiffs' lawyer, Alfred Julien, used to visit his clients' homes, eat dinner with
them, and become their friends. Julien had done so, in the words of colleague Norman Sheresky,
"simply so that he can feel closer to them and ... more immersed in their causes. The deeper the
relationship he develops the easier it seems for him, he believes, to communicate with the 
jury."
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in effectuating settlements (they are), 42 nor that lawyers are different
than clients (they are); it is only to say that defendant insurance com-
panies probably suffer less from emotional cognitive biases than
highly emotionally invested personal injury attorneys. Ultimately, the
buck stops with clients, anyway. The people making the final deci-
sions are not the supposedly more cool-headed lawyers but the (often)
upset claimants to whose decisions lawyers are ethically bound to
defer.
Professor Mitchell also points out that accountability can greatly af-
fect decisionmakers: "The situational variable with perhaps the most
far-reaching effects on judgment and decisionmaking behavior ... is
the degree to which a decisionmaker is held accountable for his or her
decisions. Accountable and unaccountable decisionmakers often act
differently. '43 This is not to say that accountability is a panacea for
cognitive biases or that all people react the same way to every type of
accountability; however, in some situations, accountability ameliorates
cognitive biases by encouraging self-criticism and reexamination.4
Individual tort plaintiffs can look only to themselves, but corporate(and therefore insurance company) employees at every level are disci-
plined by the market appraising their services. Since intra- and inter-
company markets hold insurance company employees accountable,
these markets discipline insurance company decisionmakers and re-
duce the effect of their cognitive biases by inducing self-criticism and
reexamination. They have at least the possibility of mitigating some
biases and improving their performance in appraising the value of
claims. But plaintiffs are not held responsible to any outside competi-
tion and lack even the possibility of this type of judgment-enhancing
accountability. If plaintiffs fail to appraise the true value of their
claims, no competitive market for plaintiffs exists to hold a plaintiff
accountable.
Even if accountability does not significantly correct the biases of
any given insurance company employee on any given claim, a corpo-
rate decisionmaker who routinely fails can still be replaced with some-
one more successful. Indeed, whole companies that fail to see the
difference between strong and weak tort claims can be driven out of
business by superior competition. Because personal injury claims gen-
erally cannot be sold (except to the defendant), any failure of plain-
tiffs, no matter how egregious, to appraise the value of their claims
42. See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement:
A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REV. 77 (1997).
43. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 110.
44. Id. at 111-12.
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can never result in the substitution of a new and more successful deci-
sionmaker. Again, plaintiffs are accountable only to themselves,
which means, in effect, plaintiffs are not technically accountable at
all.45
Nor does the assistance of a lawyer sufficiently counterbalance the
plaintiff's lack of accountability, which in fact seems to underscore an-
other problem with plaintiffs' capacity to appraise their claims. The
plain fact is plaintiffs' attorneys also are not all that accountable to
outside markets or, realistically, even to their clients. 46 True, plaintiffs
generally have the legal right to dismiss their lawyers. 47 But the aver-
age plaintiff is scarcely in a position to monitor and control the more
knowledgeable lawyer. This releases the lawyer, as well, from much
outside accountability. Consider, for example, the almost complete
lack of disciplinary actions by'bar associations against personal injury
lawyers despite formidable evidence of unfair practices.48 Much is
also made of the conflicts of interest between personal injury lawyers
and their clients, which can lead to an attorney to push for "the brass
ring," as opposed to accepting a certain and adequate settlement, or,
conversely, settling contrary to the client's interests in order to spend
much less time on the case and thereby receive a much higher per
hour return.49 Markets do not appear to subject such lawyers to much
discipline because the market for personal injury lawyers (unlike the
market for insurance company decisionmakers) is simply not price
competitive.5 0 Because, then, insurance companies, in contrast, are
disciplined by market competition, they are strongly inclined to cor-
rect inaccurate biases or suffer punishment through competition. But
plaintiffs, answering to no one but themselves for their cognitive bi-
45. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 110 (noting that "[a]ccountability within the context of
judgment and choice refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to
justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions to others" (citing Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E.
Tetlock, Accounting for the Effect of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999)). This
definition of accountability does not contemplate accountability to oneself. One could point to a
breadwinner/claimant's accountability to his/her dependents but it is scarcely comparatively
enforceable.
46. See O'CONNELL, supra note 14, at 43-47. See also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying
text (observing that lawyers are rarely disciplined for their misconduct, and that the market for
contingent fee-financed litigation is not price competitive).
47. See, e.g., In re Lydig's Will, 187 N.E. 298, 298 (1933) ("A client has an absolute right to
discharge his attorney with or without cause at any time .... ").
48. See Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates and the Disciplinary Sys-
tem: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1357 (1996).
49. See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price-
Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 84 (2003).
50. Id.
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ases, are comparatively ill-equipped to make utility-maximizing deci-
sions through outside accountability.
Note also that plaintiffs and their lawyers are under little if any con-
straint to moderate their claims for more than adequate payment,
whereas insurance company personnel are in general under some con-
straints to moderate their desire for less than adequate payment: Un-
like claimants and their lawyers, for insurance personnel earning the
good will of the public is a factor (admittedly diluted by other consid-
erations) in their claim practices. In other words, claimants and their
lawyers have no comparable incentive to win anyone's good will by
their restraint.
Also, insurance companies in every state are subject to regulatory
discipline for clearly improper behavior. 51 Since that discipline is by
no means always forthcoming, no outside regulatory control exists for
claimants and rarely, if ever, for their lawyers given the massive reluc-
tance of either judges or bar associations to exert any discipline.
VI. CONCLUSION
If one assumes that prompt, periodic payment of an injured claim-
ants' net economic loss is generally optimal, then early offers statutes
properly allocate responsibility for making early offers to defendants
in malpractice and other personal injury claims. As previously noted,
defendants are normally companies that insure providers of goods and
services. They desire to maximize the value of their companies. The
early offers alternative extends to insurers an opportunity to maximize
their value by resolving claims before they reach expensive, uncertain,
and lengthy litigation. The price for avoiding the tort system is to pay
plaintiffs immediately for their net economic loss as it accrues-which
is a huge improvement for plaintiffs as a class over the current uncer-
tainty, delay, and transaction costs. In the end, plaintiffs and defend-
ants can both share the gains from exiting the current tort system.
In sum, the parties best suited to calculate the costs and benefits of
making statutorily defined early offers are corporate defendants. De-
fendants alone have sufficient incentive to distinguish meritorious
from non-meritorious claims. In addition, corporate entities probably
suffer less than injured tort victims from cognitive biases. By relying
on corporations-constrained by the statutory requirements of the
early offers plan-to compute the crucial calculations, in the aggre-
gate and for a huge majority of individual complaints, both sides
benefit.
51. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 938-39 (1988).
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